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Ambulo Ergo Sum1 
Lucy O’Brien 
I. Do I exist? 
It is an extraordinary thing that Descartes’ famous Cogito argument is still being puzzled 
over. For over three hundred years philosophers have argued about how long the Cogito 
argument is, about how many parts it has, about what it aims to do, and about whether it 
works. This paper is another fragment in that untiring tradition of puzzlement.   
 
Let us assume that the Cogito seeks to answer the question ‘do I exist?’ If I were, for any 
reason, looking for re-assurance about my own existence and were thereby led to ask the 
question ‘do I have a grounds for thinking I exist?’ would the Cogito furnish me with a 
positive answer? I am going to argue that the Cogito can be construed in such a way that it 
does provide for a positive answer to that question. In the Second Meditation, Descartes 
engages in thought, judges ‘I am thinking’ (cogito), and from that, rightly in my view, 
infers ‘I exist’ (sum). We can do the same. On my understanding of it, the Cogito is an 
argument type that enables each of us to establish our own existence simply on the basis 
of our own conscious acts of thinking. A subject who engages in conscious thought, 
judges (on that basis) that they are thinking, may rightly infer on that basis that they exist.  
 
John Campbell in his ‘Lichtenberg and the Cogito’ argues in favour of Cogito-scepticism. 
Campbell claims that the Cogito is either too weak to provide us with an existential 
conclusion, or it is question begging.2 Either way, the grounds of the Cogito do not, on his 
view, provide a subject with a reason to judge she exists.  
 
My aim in this is to argue, against the Cogito-sceptic, that there is a way of construing 
conscious thinking on which the Cogito can be seen to provide a non-question begging 
argument for one’s own existence.  
 
II. Campbell’s objection to the Cogito  
                                                        
1 I am grateful for comments from audiences at the Royal Institute of Philosophy, at 
research seminars in Southampton and Dublin, and at the Oxford Graduate Conference 
and conference on ‘Self and Agency’ in Liege. Particular thanks for written comments to 
Daniel Whiting.  
2 John Campbell, ‘Lichtenberg and the Cogito’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 122 
(2012), 361-378.  
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To start let us set out the target argument in the way that Campbell does, and state his 
objection.  The target argument runs as follows:   
 
Engagement in (1) A particular act of conscious thinking; 
Judgment: (2) I am thinking; 
Judgment, by inference: (3) I exist.3 
 
So understood, the Cogito argument has three parts. The first part is not a premise or a 
judgment: it is an occurrence. In particular, it is an engagement in a particular act of 
conscious thinking. The second part of the argument is a judgment: the judgment ‘I am 
thinking’. This judgment is supposed to be grounded in, but not inferred from, the first 
part – the engagement in a particular act of conscious thinking.  The third part of the 
argument is the conclusion we are aiming at: the judgment ‘I exist’. The judgment ‘I exist’ 
follows by inference from the judgment ‘I am thinking’.  
 
The target argument according to Campbell faces a dilemma: either we get to the conclusion 
by begging the question, or we do not get to conclusion.  
 
Let us consider the ‘either’ fork first. The claim, in essence, is that (3) needs to be assumed 
to get from (1) to (2): you need to have knowledge of your own existence i.e. knowledge 
of the conclusion ‘I exist’ in order to be able to move from engagement in the particular 
act of conscious thinking to the judgement that ‘I am thinking’. The grounds for the 
claim that engagement in conscious acts of thinking are insufficient to ground 
judgements about thinkers are to a large extent the traditional Lichtenbergian grounds: 
                                                        
3 This way of setting out the argument is due to Peacocke’s ‘Descartes’ Defended’.   
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 86 (1): 109–125 to which Campbell’s paper is a 
reply.  Peacocke argues there, as I do here, that the Cogito is successful. And we are to a 
large extent in agreement as to why. Peacocke’s defence rests on metaphysical and 
conceptual points: on the dependence of conscious events on subjects, and on what is 
required for mastery of the first person. My concern here is particularly to explore the 
implications of a thesis about how our thoughts depend on us as subjects, for a thesis of 
direct awareness of ourselves, and look at how that impacts on the success, or otherwise, 
of the Cogito.  
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‘“Thinking is going on” is what one should say, just as one says “Lightning is occurring”. 
Saying “Cogito” is too much, as soon as one translates it as “I am thinking”’4 
 
How do I know merely from a particular act of conscious thinking that I am thinking? 
Maybe all I can know is that there is thinking going on? In order for me to know that the 
thinking occurrences are being had me, do I not already need to have some reason, either 
independent of the fact that I am thinking, or invoked by it, for believing that I exist? And 
if I need already to have these reasons, then I can get my transition between (1) and (2), 
but I have begged the question because I am using independent grounds for (3) to make 
the transition. Thus, the argument needs to assume what it seeks to establish to get from 
the first step – the act of conscious thinking – to the second. If the use of ‘I’ in (2) implies 
that a self exists, then you need to know you exist before you are entitled to use it to report 
your conscious thinking and so, as Campbell explains it:  
 
‘The transition from (1) to (2) therefore cannot be thought of as grounding or explaining 
one’s knowledge of one’s own existence. 
 
(1) a particular conscious thought 
 
 
Knowledge of my own existence 
 
(2) I am thinking 
 
      
 
 
(3) I exist 
 
The downward arrows indicate transitions from one state to another.  (This way of using 
arrows was suggested to me by Pryor 2012; see also Wright 2008.) The horizontal arrow 
                                                        
4 George Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, Vol. II. (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag), §76, 
p.412. (transl. Tyler Burge, ‘Reason and the first Person’  C. Wright, B. Smith & C. 
Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press (2000)). 
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indicates that my knowledge of my own existence is required for the transition from state 
(1) to state (2) to be capable of generating knowledge that I am thinking. In this situation, 
we cannot regard the transitions (1)–(3) as explaining how it is that I know of my own 
existence.  Rather, my knowledge of my own existence has to come from somewhere else, 
somewhere quite outside the range of Cogito-style reasoning.’5 
 
Now let us turn to the ‘or’ fork. The claim on this fork of the dilemma is that while there 
may be a way to get from (1) to (2), without assuming (3), it is a way that then does not 
allow us to get to (3).  
 
Suppose we claim that we can ground the judgment ‘I am thinking’ in an engagement in a 
conscious act of thinking without already assuming that ‘I exist’ because uses of ‘I’ need 
not carry referential import. Rather in judging that ‘I am thinking’ I am operating with a 
use of ‘I’ that has merely perspectival import. To illustrate the possibility of a notion having 
perspectival, but not referential import, Campbell looks to the case of temporal notions. I 
may not realize that there are time zones when I identify the current time as ‘5 o’clock’, 
but I am doing so relative to the time zone I occupy.  It does not follow, he argues, that in 
holding that it is ‘5 o’clock’ I am referring to that time zone.6 The suggestion is that we 
may use ‘I’ in a way that is relative to the person I am but does not refer to the person I 
am. The thought seems to be that I may use ‘I’ in a way that is relative to the subject I am, 
even when I do not realize I am a one subject rather than another. And if that is so then 
we can get from (1) to (2) without assuming (3). However, we then face a problem with 
the move from (2) to (3). If we construe the ‘I am thinking’ non-referentially we are not 
then entitled to move from ‘I am thinking’ to ‘I exist’. Using the arrow diagram used by 
Campbell we can represent the situation as follows: 
 
(1) a particular conscious thinking 
 
No assumption that I exist 
 
(2) I am thinking 
                                                        
5 Campbell, ‘Lichtenberg and the Cogito’, p.365.  
6 Campbell, ‘Lichtenberg and the Cogito’, p.369. 
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    ?  
(3) I exist 
 
III. Can we avoid begging the question?  
I think it is clear that if we withdraw to a use of ‘I’ which is non-referential, then there is 
no getting from (2) the judgment ‘I am thinking to (3) the judgment ‘I exist’, unless we 
have a similarly ‘non-existential’ notion of existence – and what could that be? So, our 
only hope if we want maintain the claims of the Cogito to provide us with a way of 
gaining knowledge of our existence is to challenge the question-begging charge. In 
particular we need a way to challenge the claim that an engagement in a conscious act of 
thinking is not sufficient to warrant a subject in moving to the judgment ‘I am thinking’, 
unless she independently assumes her own existence.  
 
Campbell compares the Cogito to Moore’s famous ‘Proof the External World’ and draws 
out interesting parallels between the two. 7  Campbell construes Moore’s argument as 
follows: 
  
Engagement in (1b) a visual perception of your hands 
Judgment: (2b) this is one hand, and this is another hand; 
Judgment: (3b) external objects exist.8 
 
Both arguments seem to have three components, the first of which is a psychological 
conscious occurrence, the second of which is an indexical or demonstrative judgment, 
and third of which is an existential judgment. In Moore’s argument we have a conscious 
visual perception that grounds without inference the indexical judgment ‘this is one 
hand, and this is another hand’, from which we can infer the existential judgment that 
‘external objects exist’.  In the Cogito argument we have a conscious act of thinking that 
grounds the indexical judgment ‘I am thinking’, from which we can infer the existential 
judgment that ‘I exist’.  
 
                                                        
7 G. E. Moore, ‘Proof of an External World’. Proceedings of the British Academy, 25 (1939), 
273–300. 
8 Campbell, ‘Lichtenberg and the Cogito’, 376.  
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It is commonly objected that Moore’s argument fails because we need to assume 
knowledge of the existence of external objects in order to be warranted in moving from 
(1b) to (2b). Now Moore’s argument was famously thought to involve a problem of a 
similar kind to the Lichtenbergian problem that Campbell puts to the Cogito argument, 
namely that it is acceptable to move from (1b) to (2b), only when we have assumed or 
independently establish (3b) – which was supposed to be our conclusion. So again we’re 
faced with the dilemma that, either we get to the conclusion by begging the question, or 
we don’t get to the conclusion. 
 
The familiar complaint against Moore’s argument is usually fleshed out via an argument 
from illusion. Suppose I have a visual perception of my hands, and I judge on that basis 
that ‘this is one hand, and this is the other hand’, it may be objected that you cannot 
justifiably move to the conclusion that ‘external objects exist’, unless you assume that 
your visual experience was caused by your hands. After all, it is objected, if you had been 
hallucinating, or be subject to an illusion, you could have had the same visual experience 
and it not be caused by your hands. If that is true then it looks as though you are going to 
have to assume existence of external objects, alongside with your visual perception, in 
order to move to your conclusion that external objects exist – and that is begging the 
question. If instead we try to row back from the assumption that external objects exist, 
and construe the judgment ‘this is one hand, and this is another hand’ in such a way that 
can be grounded on the visual perception alone, we will not, the argument goes, have 
sufficient resources to reach an existential conclusion.  When I judge that ‘this is one 
hand, and this is another hand’ I am not thereby referring to any external object. My uses 
of ‘this’ are used with perspectival, but non-referential, import and used properly across 
veridical and illusory cases.   
 
So, we see a parallel objection to both the Cogito and to Moore’s argument. In relation to 
both we can object that a conscious experience is not itself able to deliver up knowledge 
of the existence of objects: selves or hands. To draw our conclusions we need already to 
know that there is some object or self beyond the experience; we need to know that it is 
not a mere experience of nothing, had by nothing. But to rely on such knowledge would be 
to beg the question.  
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Despite so elegantly bringing out the parallels between the two arguments Campbell’s 
central concern is in fact to claim a contrast between them. Campbell rehearses an 
increasingly popular defence of Moore’s argument, but claims that a parallel response is 
not available to the defender of the Cogito. It is that claim I want to examine. 
 
What is the popular defence of Moore’s argument against the charge of question 
begging? It is to point out that while it is true that on certain ways of construing the 
nature of visual perception one would need to add a further assumption (that, say, an 
external object is the causal source, or the represented object, of the perceptual 
experience) in order to justifiably draw the conclusion that external objects exist, such a 
construal is not compulsory. There are other ways to construe the nature of visual 
experiences on which such an added assumption would not be required. Suppose, we 
take a relationalist, or direct realist view of visual experiences.  On such a view to have a 
visual perception of a hand is to have an experience in virtue of standing in a direct 
relation to a hand. If there were no hand, there would be no such visual experience. 
Therefore, if we are actually seeing one hand and then another hand, that visual 
experience can by itself function as grounds for the judgment ‘this is one hand, this is 
another hand’ without any independent premise being required. So if, as Campbell puts 
it, it is possible to argue that the external object is not in fact ‘beyond’ or ‘external to’ the 
visual perception, but rather the visual experience ‘encompass[es] the external object’, 
then the visual experience will be ‘enough on its own to generate knowledge of the 
existence of external objects’.9 
 
Having rehearsed the resources of a relationalist response to the question-begging 
challenge facing Moore’s argument, Campbell makes this intriguing remark: ‘in contrast, 
in case of the Cogito there seems no possibility of a disjunctive or relational understanding 
of your relation with your thought on which your encounter with the thought 
encompasses not just the thought but the thinker’.10 
 
For the remainder of this paper I want explore whether we should accept that there is no 
such possibility.  Could we not construe what it is to be engaged in a conscious act of 
                                                        
9 Campbell, ‘Lichtenberg and the Cogito’, 377. 
10 Campbell, ‘Lichtenberg and the Cogito’, 377. 
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thinking in such a way that it ‘encompass[es] me’ and is ‘enough on its own to generate 
knowledge’ that I exist?  
 
IV. Solvitur Ambulando? 
I want to suggest that the prospects for the view that in being engaged in a conscious act 
of thinking a subject has a direct experience of herself of a kind sufficient in itself to 
ground the judgment ‘I am thinking’ might be made more evident if we think about our 
experience of acts and activities other than thinking.  
 
Let us, for example, think about the conscious activities of walking or jumping. Walking 
and jumping are things that I do. They are also things I am aware of doing as I do them.  
 
The first question to ask about our awareness of such activities is whether we have any 
reason to be more skeptical of having a direct awareness of them, than that we have 
direct awareness of our hands or coffee cups. When I am conscious of my walking or my 
jumping, my walking and my jumping seems to be as immediate and directly accessible to 
me as anything given in perception. And when I am conscious of your walking or 
jumping, your walking and jumping seems to be as immediate and directly accessible to 
me as anything else given in perception. 
 
The second question to ask is how we should understand the relation that holds between 
our awareness of the actions and activities, and our awareness of the agents that carry 
them out. Let us suppose you have an awareness of my walking. You see me walk across 
the room, for example. We would think it very odd if you were to claim that while you 
saw my walk you could not, or did not, see me. Rather, when you see me walking what 
you see is me doing something: you see me in a certain mode, carrying out a certain set of 
bodily movements that are my walking.  
 
The thought is that if you put the answers to the two questions just asked together, then 
there is scope to claim that can be directly aware of agents in being directly aware of their 
actions.  If we are aware of activities or actions by being aware of an agent doing 
something, and we are directly aware of those actions then the agent would seem to be a 
candidate for being ‘encompassed’ within the experience of the activity.  
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If it turns out that there is no insurmountable impediment to my understanding my 
awareness of my action (walking or jumping) as a direct relation to these activities, and 
that the relationship between actions and activities and the agents that carry them out is 
such that if you are aware of the action or activity you are aware of a mode of an agent, 
then we begin to have the resources to mount a response, of a kind the relationalist 
about visual perception mounts against the charge that Moore’s argument begs the 
question, to the charge that the Cogito begs the question.  
 
There are three claims made by the view being mooted. The third is supposed to follow 
from a proper understanding of the first two. The three claims are: 
 
1. A direct awareness of action thesis: when we consciously act we are directly aware of 
the activity/action. When we are conscious of others acting we are directly aware 
of the activity/action.  
 
2. An activities and actions as modes of an agent thesis: activities or actions are dependent 
on agents, in virtue of being modes of agents – they are ways an agent is being, or 
has been.  
 
3. A direct awareness of agent thesis: to directly conscious of an activity/action is to be 
directly conscious of a way an agent is, and so directly conscious of an agent. (For 
example, to be directly conscious of a jumping is to be conscious of the jumper 
jumping, to be directly conscious of a walking is to be conscious of the walker 
walking.)  
 
Let us suppose that claims 1-3 are true of our awareness of walking. If they are then we 
have reason to think we have available to us an argument that is capable of being used to 
establish our own existence that does not fall foul of either the insufficiency charge, or 
the charge of question begging. We can call the argument the Ambulo argument. Its 
structure is similar to that of the Cogito, and of Moore’s argument, and comes in three 
parts: A psychological occurrence, an indexical judgment, and an existential claim: 
 
Engagement in (1) A particular conscious walking;  
Judgment: (2) I am walking 
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Judgment, by inference: (3) I exist.  
 
 
The Ambulo – assuming theses 1-3 are true of a subject engaged in consciously walking – 
is successful in grounding in a non-question begging way the judgment ‘I am walking’.  
It is able to do so in the same way that Moore’s argument is able to ground the judgment 
that external objects exist in our direct awareness of them. We have construed the 
experience of acting is such a way that the acting, and so the actor, is not beyond or 
external to the conscious experience, but is ‘encompassed’ in it.  In consciously walking 
I’m directly aware of the walking and thereby of the walker, and can on that basis infer 
that I exist. And of course if the Ambulo works as a proof of my existence then there is 
shed more where that came from. For example: 
 
Engagement in (1) A particular conscious jumping;  
Judgment: (2) I am jumping;  
Judgment, by inference (3) I exist.   
 
Let us then turn back to the intricacies of the Cogito. If they can be made to work with 
the right assumptions about the nature of our experience of activities and their relations 
to agents, and if thinking is rightly understood as an activity of a subject – along the lines 
that walking and jumping are – might we in fact have a non-question begging Cogito 
argument. Suppose, as well 1-3, we also claim:  
 
4. Thinking is an activity of an agent thesis: thinking is an activity of an agent in the 
same way that walking, jumping, and so on, are activities of an agent. 
 
When we then go back to the Cogito we are able to see a form of argument which would, 
if what seems to be true for walking is true of thinking, provide us with conception of 
conscious activity that is able to give us direct awareness of ourselves if we are engaged 
in such an activity – in in doing so can ground the Judgment I am thinking, and in tern 
the judgement ‘I exist’: 
 
Engagement (1) A conscious act/activity of thinking 
Judgement: (2) I am thinking  
Judgment, by inference: (3) I exist 
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V. Gassendi’s Ambulo 
The idea that we should look to the Ambulo argument alongside the Cogito argument to 
throw light on the latter is not a new one. It is already there in Gassendi’s objections to 
Descartes. Gassendi points out that there is nothing very special in the form of argument 
provided by the Cogito and claims that Descartes ‘could have made the same inference 
from any one of [his] actions, since it is known by the natural light that whatever acts 
exists’11   
 
Descartes’ replies to Gassendi as follows:   
You say that I could have made the same inference from any one of my other 
actions, but that is far from the truth. Because my thought is the only one of my 
actions of which I am completely certain…For example, I can’t say ‘I am walking, 
therefore I exist’, except by adding to my walking my awareness of walking, which 
is a thought. The inference is certain only if the premise concerns this awareness 
and not the movement of my body; because it can happen e.g. in dreams that I see 
to myself to be walking but am really not doing so. And so from the fact that I 
think I am walking I can very well infer the existence of a mind that thinks but not 
the existence of a body that walks. The same holds for all the other cases.’12  
 
For our purposes there are three things to note about this exchange.  First, Descartes’ 
objection parallels the standard objection to Moore’s argument. He points out that we 
cannot know for certain that we are walking because we have erroneously had the 
experience of walking even when we are not – for example, when we are dreaming. This 
fact is supposed to undermine the possibility of the Ambulo giving us knowledge that we 
                                                        
11 J. Bennett (ed), Objections to the Mediations and Descartes’ Replies, ‘Fifth Objections 
(Gassendi) and Descartes’ replies: Objections to Second Meditation; Objection 1’. 
www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/descartes1642/pdf, p.86.  
 
12 J. Bennett (ed), Objections to the Mediations and Descartes’ Replies, ‘Fifth Objections 
(Gassendi) and Descartes’ replies: Objections to Second Meditation; Reply to Objection 




exist. Descartes assumes that our experience of walking is not to be construed as 
essentially involving walking. But if we were to adopt relationalism about our experience 
of walking we could deny this.  Second, Descartes does not deny that ‘it is known by the 
natural light that whatever acts exists’ and does not dispute the idea that if you know the 
act you know that the actor exists. The third thing to note about Descartes’ response to 
the argument is that his concern is to emphasize that in the case of walking, in contrast 
to thinking, you don’t know the act with certainty. You might think you are walking - as 
in a dream - but you might be wrong. So, what thinking is supposed to give us is 
certainty.  The point here is that if walking is activity of mine, then nothing has been said 
to block a non-question begging argument for my existence. The conditional nature of 
that claim should be noted here. If walking is not an activity of mine that picks out a way 
I am, then being aware of walking will not be a way of being aware of myself. And 
Descartes might indeed be skeptic about walking as an action of the subject. It is a 
delicate question whether Descartes takes the subject of my bodily activities to be me - if 
the subject of those activities is a conjoined mind and body. If, instead, only acts of the 
mind are properly acts of the subject, then walking might be some act of mind that is 
mine, plus a caused or conjoined bodily activity which is the act of some other thing. If 
that were the case, and I were directly aware of both the act of mind and the bodily 
activity I would be aware of two things only one of which is me. If I were directly aware 
only of the act of mind then I would be directly aware only of me – but I would not be 
aware of my walking.  
 
However, if walking is a proper activity of the subject, and the subject is directly aware of 
it, this suggests that a possible, if anachronistic, reply is available to Gassendi. It may be, 
he could reply, that we cannot know with certainty that I am walking on the basis of my 
conscious activity of walking. But if you grant that my experience incorporates my 
walking, and by so doing incorporates me as that of which it is a mode, I can know, non-
infallibly, on that basis that I exist.  
 
We need, in other words, to separate out the question of whether experience can provide 
non-question begging grounds for existence claims, from the question of whether it 
delivers certainty in the face of the sceptic. If we are interested just in the first question, 
about whether or not the Ambulo argument gives us non-question begging grounds for 
our existence, then Descartes’ response does not close off a positive answer. We have 
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got a reason, through our experience of walking, to believe that we exist. Certainty is 
another issue. It is true that we may be wrong about whether we are actually walking – 
we could be dreaming – but in that case we have not, on the account of engaging in 
conscious acting being considered, got a conscious experience of walking. All we have is 
an illusion of walking, and that was never claimed to offer us grounds for a proof of our 
existence. And note that certainty over our acts and activities does not get much easier if 
we limit ourselves to activities that do not involve movements of the body – which we 
might think are not primary activities of the self for Descartes. Consider covert activities 
such as guessing or supposing. Whether or not a subject is supposing, or guessing, or 
even judging, might seem to imply certain dispositional features: whether they are 
prepared to discharge the supposition, whether they lack knowledge on the matter they 
are guessing about, whether they are prepared to use their judgement as a reason in a 
argument. Given this it seems clear that one can make sense of someone taking 
themselves to be supposing, guessing, judging when those features do not obtain and so, 
when that are in fact not supposing, guessing or judging. They only have the illusion of 
doing so. It is no surprise that certainty is hard to come by, but it is worth noting that it 
is hard to come by both in relation to covert psychological acts/activities such as 
supposings and guessings, and overt psychological activities such as walkings and 
jumpings.  
 
We will come back to whether the activity of thinking has a special capacity to secure 
certainty in a way that the other activities don’t. But for the moment let me sum up 
where we have got to. I have claimed that if in engaging in a conscious action we have a 
direct experience of our actions which is to understood in the way that the relationalist 
Moorean thinks that I have direct experience of my hand, then we have available to us a 
form of Cogito argument that can, in a non-question-begging way, provide grounds for 
knowledge of our own existence.  
 
I not provided arguments, and am not going to, for the claim that we do indeed have 
direct experience of our actions, and of us acting. I think the view that in acting we have 
an experience of our actions which encompasses those actions, and their agents is right – 
and indeed may be more plausible than the parallel view in relation to visual perception. 
However, my interest in this paper is only to identify the space for it, and establish the 
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conditional conclusion that if the view were right, and if thinking is the activity of an 
agent, then there is a non-question begging version of the Cogito.   
 
However, before turning to objections, there is scope to emphasise an advantage that 
would flow from such a view of our experience of our actions – other than providing a 
working version of the Ambulo, and in turn the Cogito, on the assumption that thinking is 
a form of acting. The view has much the same advantage that tends to advertised by the 
relationalist about perception in general: that it concords with our sense of being in direct 
contact with that which we are aware of.  If we did not have direct experiences of our 
walkings, jumpings and so on, we would face the prospect of residing in a 
phenomenological bubble of action awareness with the actions themselves always 
something that’s beyond our experience of them.  It is often claimed by relationists about 
perception that non-relationalism leaves a subject alienated from the world by ‘a veil of 
perception’. If there is such an alienation, then the extent of it is hugely magnified if the 
separation is not just between me and the external world, but between me and every one 
of my activities – both covert and overt. Every action I carry out – my walking, jumping, 
supposing and guessing – would be somehow distinct from and beyond my experience 
of it.  That kind of picture would be decisively set aside if one accepted the relationalist 
view.  
 
VI. Limits and obstacles  
 
(i) The nature of thinking. One thing one might say in response to the above discussion is: 
look, I accept the Ambulo argument. I am convinced that, if we take walking to be a 
genuine mode or way a subject might be behaving, then in being directly aware of the 
walking I am directly aware of the subject walking. And if we do that, then the Ambulo is 
an argument I can use to prove my own existence. Suppose I am lying in a floatation 
tank and start to have doubts about whether I exist - perhaps I start to worry that I am 
merely some kind of cognitive ether and have no real existence.  All I need to do is to get 
out and walk. If I engage in the conscious activity of walking I will have all the grounds I 
need to prove that I exist. 
 
But that, the objection runs, is not going to resurrect the Cogito. It is not going to 
resurrect the Cogito because we’ve got no reason to think that thinking is an activity of a 
subject, awareness of which provides awareness of the subject. If I am a human being 
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and my walking is way a human being is behaving then it is plausible to think one’s 
consciousness of my walking is consciousness of me. But, it might be urged, thinking is 
something quite different. Thinking is not a way a whole human being behaves in the 
way that walking is - and when I am aware of my thinking I am not aware of the human 
being - I am aware only of the thinking disconnection from it being my thinking. It is 
further step, requiring rational support to take awareness of my thinking an evidence of 
my existence.  
 
I have said that I am not going to argue for the view that thinking is an activity of a 
subject and has no reality without being a mode of the subject. And I am not. Nor am I going to 
argue that we should think ourselves as human beings for whom thinking and walking 
are active modes in similar ways. My argument is conditional – if that is the right view of 
thinking and walking then the argument works.  
 
However, I do want to urge in reply to the objection presented, that on the most 
common sense picture of what we in fact are, the natural thing to think about thinking is 
that, just like walking, and jumping, it is an activity of a human being. If we ask the 
question ‘What do human beings do?’ we might very well answer along the following 
lines: ‘Well, we walk, jump, dance, talk, think, question, argue, skip and a whole lot of 
other things’. Thinking, questioning, doubting, all fall very naturally into a set of activities 
that are given as an answer to the question ‘What do we human beings do?’  
 
That this is a natural and common sense thing to say about thinking – that is just another 
on of the many kinds of activities that human being get up to – can be brought out if we 
look at how we qualify attributions of thinking to people. We use much the same adverbs 
to qualify ongoing cognitive activities as ongoing overt physical ones. We think slowly, 
we can get interrupted thinking, we can think frenetically and anxiously. That there is 
such a continuity between the overt physical activities of a subject and thinking is 
brought out by the fact that one of the ways you can think, is by talking. Talking is very 
often a way of thinking. Sometimes we think by talking to others: we often do not think 
the thought and then work out how to communicate it. We just talk. Sometimes we think 
by talking out loud to ourselves, and sometimes by talking to ourselves in what Ryle 
called ‘silent soliloquy’. Similarly, we can think by writing – to ourselves or to others. Of 
course, sometimes we think without talking or writing at all – even to ourselves. We 
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have, however, no reason to hold that in such thinking a subject is operating in a 
fundamentally different mode from when she is talking or writing. Obviously, if you 
think out loud you need to move your mouth, or if you are working out your thoughts 
on paper you have to move your hands, whereas if you are engaged in silent soliloquy, or 
thinking without talking or writing at all, you need only engage a more restricted part of 
your body. It would only be if our awareness of our talking and writing amounted only to 
our awareness of the movement of our arms and lips that this would give us a reason to 
hold that there is a radical asymmetry between being aware of ourselves engaged in 
talking and writing, and awareness of ourselves in covert thinking. Our awareness of our 
awareness of our talking and writing does not amount only to our awareness of the 
movement of our arms and lips – if it involves it at all.   
 
We have no obvious reason to hold that there is an asymmetry between our awareness of 
different kinds of thinking such that when we are consciously engaged in talking out loud 
we are aware of ourselves in virtue of consciously engaging in such talking, but when we 
are engaged in covert thinking we are not. 
 
The other thing to wonder when one worries about whether thinking is really an activity 
of a subject is to ask ‘what is the alternative picture?’ There is a way of talking about 
conscious thought that makes it sound like a kind of phenomenological glitter. On this 
picture there could be phenomenological stuff going on in all sorts of unlikely places – 
conscious ripples disturbing murky puddles on Alpha Centuri. Or perhaps the idea is that 
that there could be brain fragments that could carry on the activity of thinking without 
there being any subject doing the thinking?  But that is a very peculiar view – maybe I 
can survive if enough of my brain does – but if all we are left with is fragments we have 
little reason to suppose we are left with any thinking either. Ryle talks about the 
‘elastictities of uses of “I” and “me”’. He asks us to:  
 
consider some contexts in which ‘I’ and ‘me’ can certainly not be replaced by ‘my 
body’ or ‘my leg’. If I say ‘I am annoyed that I was cut in the collision, while I 
might accept the substitution of ‘my leg was cut’ for ‘I was cut’, I should not allow 
‘I am annoyed’ to be reconstructed in such a way. It would be simply absurd to 
speak of ‘my head remembering’, ‘my brain doing long division’.13  
                                                        
13 G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p. 180-81 
 17 
 
I agree with Ryle: the whole of me does these things, not bits of me – even if the whole 
of me can shrink to something quite small. Further, and similarly, it seems to me 
confusing to talk of ‘my legs walking’ or ‘my lips talking’.  Of course, these issues will not 
be settled until we settle what thinking is, and settle how we can coherently talk about 
thinking. It may be that the conditions on thinking can be met other than by whole 
subjects in certain conditions. But I think it very likely that they will not be.  
 
(ii) Knowing a thinker exists vs knowing I exist.14 There is a second objection that might be 
raised even if it is agreed that there way of construing the relation between awareness of 
activities, and their agents, that means that the standard Lichtenbergian objection would 
not get any traction. The fact that you will not get ‘thinking going on’ unless you have a 
subject thinking – along with the fact that this is known ‘by the natural light’ – will get 
you knowledge that the subject exists. Still, the objection runs, you will not get anything 
as strong as the conclusion that ‘I exist’ – the most you will get is the conclusion 
‘Someone exists’.  The fact that the subject that exists is me is additional to knowing that 
a subject exist.  
 
This suggests the possibility of a non first-personal, existential version of the Ambulo:  
 
Engagement in (1) A conscious walking  
Judge: (2) Someone is walking  
Infer the judgment: (3) Therefore, Someone exists 
 
My response to this objection is threefold.  
 
First, even if this objection is right about the inaccessibility of the first person judgement 
it is wrong to think that we can get only an existential conclusion. We can also reach a 
demonstrative conclusion – ‘this subject’ who walking I am aware of exists; ‘this subject’ 
whose thinking I am aware of exists: 
 
Engagement in (1) A conscious walking  
Judge: (2) This subject is walking  
                                                        
14 Thanks to Daniel Whiting for raising this issue.  
 18 
Infer the judgment: (3) Therefore, This subject exists 
 
Second, the fact that we have identified an existential and demonstrative version of the 
Ambulo is itself of note. If it is granted that awareness of an activity of a self is sufficient 
to ground awareness of a subject and warranted judgements about that subject – whether 
or not I know it that that self is me – we have re-positioned the gap that was supposed to 
be surpassed. It is no longer a gap between an act of thinking and its subject, but 
between a thinking subject and identifying who that subject is.  
 
Three, we do have forms of direct awareness of activities of subject that themselves may 
warrant only the demonstrative and existential conclusions – such as when we see 
someone walk – whether we see another, or see ourselves reflected in a mirror.  
However, when we ourselves engage in the conscious activities of walking or thinking, 
when we are the walker and the thinker, our awareness of what we are is through a 
distinct form of awareness – an awareness we have through being the agent of the 
activity. If that is right then, without positive reasons to think that I cannot be walking or 
thinking – or that I am subject to an illusion of agents awareness, my conscious walking 
or thinking will always provide a warrant for judging ‘I am walking’ or ‘I am thinking’.  
 
(iii) Hume’s Intuition: Something that might still worry us about the above way of trying to 
secure the epistemological respectability of the Cogito is the thought ‘what happened to 
Hume’s intuition?’ Wasn’t Hume right to observe that when we introspect we find 
ourselves missing in some way? As Hume famously put it says:  
 
‘For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble 
on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or 
hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, 
and never can observe any thing but the perception.’  
 
We have, I think, all been a bit mesmerized by this quotation. There are two things 
peculiar about it. One, is the idea in order to catch myself I need to catch myself without 
my perceptions, and need to observe anything other than the perceptions. If I manifested 
myself to introspection in perceptions, then the way to catch myself is to catch the 
perceptions. Imagine Hume had been worrying about whether external objects show up 
in vision. Are they not somehow missing? After all, he might have argued:  
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‘For my part, when I perceive an object, I always stumble on some particular 
quality or other, of square or spherical, light or heavy, blue or green. I never can 
catch the object at any time without a quality, and never can observe any thing but 
the quality.’ 
 
Now it maybe that Hume himself would in fact say that – but this way of seeing things 
does not capture a common sense way to report our phenomenology of the world and 
our capacities to be acquainted with ordinary objects. And I don’t think his quotation 
about the self should be reported, as it so often is, as the natural and common sense way 
to report our phenomenology of the self.  
 
The second peculiar thing to note is the list of things Hume thinks we should pay 
attention to in our efforts to try to find ourselves in introspection. Suppose he had 
instead ‘entered most intimately into himself’ and stumbled across his thinking, his 
looking, his seeing, his calculating, his talking, his walking, his dancing and jumping, but 
declared that he never caught himself without any of these things, then I think we would 
want to reply: ‘Well, you’ve been there all the time; you have already stumbled across 
yourself’.  What Hume seems to be asking for is observation of the self bare of all it’s 
activities; we should no more think we can experience a self bare of its activities than we 
should think we can experience an object bare of its qualities. If activities are ways I may 
be, nothing justifies the expectation that to be aware of myself I need stumble on my 
‘self’ on its own, bare and stripped of its activities?  Whatever the self is we are aware of 
it in its activities.  
 
(iv) Certainty. It seems to me that we have, given certain assumptions about the nature of 
activities and what we experience when we experience them, good reason to take 
ourselves to have available a working version of the Ambulo and the Cogito. I will end by 
asking whether we have a reason, as Descartes thought, to prefer the latter to the former 
because it gives us certainty. Do we get more with the Cogito than the Ambulo?  The 
Ambulo gives us warrant for existence of subjects, but will not survive doubt about 
whether I am really walking or just suffering an illusion to that effect.  Might the Cogito 
do better, and so doing give us not only warrant for our own existence but certainty 
about our own existence? 
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Well that depends on whether, on the picture being presented, I could coherently be 
wrong about, or doubt, whether I am thinking? Suppose it seems to me that I am 
thinking – could I be wrong?  Well, if its seeming to me that I am thinking involves my 
thinking ‘I am thinking’, then I cannot be wrong – I am thinking ‘I am thinking’ and so 
what I am thinking is self-verifying. However, perhaps there is another way to 
understand what would have to be going on for it to seem to me that I am thinking. 
Perhaps all that need be involved is an occurrence that has a feel just like this, this thinking 
now going on, but which is an occurrence that is not a thinking: it is an occurrence which 
fails a condition on thinking for one reason or another.  If it is possible for there to be an 
occurrence that has a feel just like the feel of running through the Cogito argument, but it 
is not a running of the Cogito argument because it does not involve thinking at all, then a 
thinking subject running through the Cogito may coherently wonder whether something 
like is going on rather than that she is thinking through the Cogito.  However, if she does 
so she can comfort herself with the thought that were that to be the case she is not 
wondering anything – wondering takes thinking; and she is not running through the 
Cogito – running through the Cogito takes thinking. She cannot in fact have even have 
engaged in the first step of the Cogito; she cannot have engaged in an act of conscious 
thinking. If all that is going on is a conscious non-thinking occurrence that feels like this, 
then she will not get her conclusion, but she will not her premises or her argument 
either. She will have done nothing.  However, I have argued that, as long as she started 
with a conscious thinking – although doing so might come with meeting significant 
conditions – she may be able to get her conclusion without begging the question.  
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